Culture Wars: Protection of Cultural Monuments in a Human Rights Context by Patel, Kruti J.
Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 5
1-1-2011
Culture Wars: Protection of Cultural Monuments
in a Human Rights Context
Kruti J. Patel
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For
more information, please contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kruti J. Patel, Culture Wars: Protection of Cultural Monuments in a Human Rights Context, 11 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & Comp. Law (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl/vol11/iss1/5
1 
CULTURE WARS: 
By: Kruti J. Patel 
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL MONUMENTS IN A HUMAN RIGHTS 
CONTEXT 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 A nation’s internal conflicts are often about cultural supremacy. Conflicts between 
cultures are far more dangerous than conflicts between states because, while states understand 
the language of diplomacy, parties involved in a cultural conflict often do not. Many times the 
differences between cultural blocks in a nation are so strong that they prevent any negotiations 
towards a truce. Fueled by a fundamentalist mindset, conflicts between different cultural groups 
frequently become deadly and destructive, often because the goal of the conflict is to attain 
victory by eradicating of the conflicting culture. Ultimately, many culture wars are about 
creating a homogeneous national identity.  
 Attacking the physical manifestations of the conflicting culture is one of the most 
tempting tools of cultural warfare.1
 International law recognizes the importance of protecting cultural property as both the 
heritage of a specific group and of all humankind.
 While civil wars, like the Kosovo war, provide a clear 
example of cultural conflicts under international law, the more interesting and difficult 
situations do not rise to the level of civil wars, such as the Babri Mosque Riots in India, or the 
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan. With respect to the protection of culture 
objects, international law is at its weakest where hostilities do not rise to the level of civil war.  
2
                                                 
1 KEVIN CHAMBERLAIN, WAR AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 2 (2004). 
 However, the driving force behind the major 
international cultural property preservation and protection agreements is the idea thatcultural 
2 John Henry Merryman, The F ree International Movement of Cultural Property, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1, 10-12 (1998). 
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property is the “inheritance of all human kind.”3
Cultural property is our inheritance from the past, our cultural heritage. It 
explains who we are and where we come from. The world values cultural 
property because it forms social identity and, in some instances, embodies the 
highest accomplishments of the human spirit. International laws that seek to 
protect cultural property reflect these values.
 Brennan, in her note on the Bamiyan Buddha 
situation, explains this motivation as follows: 
4
 
 
For the above stated reasons, many existing treaties recognize the need to protect cultural 
property in situations of “armed conflict” and in times of peace. The 1954 Hague Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict5 (“Hague Convention of 
1954”), and its two subsequent protocols signed in 1954 (“First Protocol”) and 1999 (“Second 
Protocol”)6 is a major treaty dealing with the protection of cultural property. 7 Other major 
treaties include the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property8 (“UNESCO 
Convention”), and the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage9
                                                 
3 Corrine Brenner, Cultural Property Law:  Reflecting on the Bamiyan Buddhas' Destruction, 29 Suffolk 
Transnat'l L. Rev. 237, 254 (2006). 
 (“World Heritage Convention”).  If every member nation was in perfect conformity 
with the specific treaty provisions of the UNESCO, Hague, and World Heritage Conventions, 
4 Id. at 237-238. 
5 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 
249 U.N.T.S. 240, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000824/082464mb.pdf [hereinafter 
Hague Convention of 1954]. 
6 Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1975 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict 1954, May 14, 1954, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000824/082464mb.pdf#page=66 
[hereinafter First Protocol]; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1999, March 26, 1999, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001306/130696eo.pdf [hereinafter Second Protocol].  
7 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 1, at 13.  
8 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 232, available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114046e.pdf#page=130 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention of 
1970] 
9 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, November 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 
37, available at http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001333/133369e.pdf [hereinafter World Heritage 
Convention]. 
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cultural property in all member nations would be adequately protected during international 
armed conflict, conflicts not of an international character, and in times of peace.  However, for 
many reasons, that is not the case.  
 International law requires states to voluntarily bind themselves to negotiated pacts; yet, 
even within these negotiated documents, there are loopholes that allow for the commission of 
prohibited conduct while circumventing the consequences of said behavior. The law is 
especially weak when it comes to obligating member states to protect their own cultural 
property through domestic legislation.10
 While adjusting the existing law to close the loopholes in international pacts may resolve 
the problems to a degree, the philosophy that drives these laws needs to be adjusted to better 
protect cultural property. Moving from a cultural internationalist approach towards a more 
individualized human rights based approach in the protection of cultural property will provide a 
better basis for creating sanctions against those responsible for the destruction of cultural 
property. Part II of this note reviews the possible protection encoded within the current 
international law regime comprised of The Hague and its Protocols and the World Heritage 
Convention.  Part III discusses the historical context  in which the treaties were created to 
provide an illustrative aid for the discussion in Part IV, which appraises the shortcomings of the 
 Two relatively recent events in world history show the 
glaring need for additional protection of cultural property, and display the ways in which the 
Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention, and the World Heritage Convention fail in these 
types of instances. The destruction of the Babri Mosque in India and the demolition of the 
Bamiyan Buddhas both provide good examples of situations where international law failed not 
only to prevent, but also to sanction nations for their failure to abide by their international 
obligations, duties, and responsibilities toward all of humankind.  
                                                 
10 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 1, at 3.  
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current international law regime protecting cultural property. Part V concludes that developing a 
human rights based regime as the basis for the protection of cultural property is necessary to 
close the loopholes of current law and correct its failures.  
II.  TREATIES IN FORCE 
A. Hague Convention of 1954 
 The Hague Convention of 1954 is the first international treaty dealing exclusively with 
the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. The specific articles of interest 
for the purposes of this discussion are Articles Three, Eighteen, and Nineteen.  
Article Eighteen provides one of the basic assumptions of the convention: except for specific 
peace-time provisions, the treaty provisions go into effect during times of declared war or armed 
conflict between two or more contracting parties, or when there is a belligerent occupation of 
one member state by other member states.11
Fundamentally, the Hague Convention of 1954 was created to function in another 
“world-war” type of situation; however, it still covered other types of scenarios. Article Three, 
one of the few peacetime provisions of the Hague, provides: “[t]he High Contracting Parties 
undertake to prepare in time of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated within 
their own territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict, by taking such measures 
as they consider appropriate.”
 This basic assumption makes perfect sense in light 
of the era of history that produced the Convention.  Post World War II, the largest concern was 
the threat of another large-scale war between many states , and the treaty reflects this fear by 
focusing on armed or war-like conflicts between two or more nations.  
12
                                                 
11 Id. at art. 18. 
 
12 Hague Convention of 1954, supra note 5, at art. 3.  
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 Article Nineteen supplies the most interesting and controversial provisions of the Hague.  
The article provides in pertinent part: “[i]n the event of an armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the 
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present Convention which 
relate to respect for cultural property.”13 This language was adopted from the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.14  This article offers guidance on determining what constitutes an armed 
conflict not of an international character. The Commentaries on the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
provide several factors that, while not exhaustive, are determinative.15 These factors include: (1) 
whether the party in revolt [against the de jure or actual government] possesses an organized 
military force, an authority responsible for its acts, and possess any means to ensure compliance 
to the Convention; (2) whether the legal government is obliged to use its regular military forces 
against insurgents organized as military in possession of the national territory; (3) whether the 
de jure government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents or has claimed belligerent 
rights; (4) whether the insurgents are organized as a state would be, and has de facto control 
over the national territory; and, finally, (5) whether the internal dispute as been submitted to the 
United Nations Security Counsel or the General Assembly of the United Nations as a threat to 
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.16
 For the purposes of Article Nineteen, the obligations to respect cultural property apply to 
“each party” of the conflict, whereas, traditionally, international obligations only applied to 
contracting states. Therefore, Article Nineteen obligates not only member states, but also 
  
                                                 
13 Id. at art. 19. 
14 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 1, at 70. 
15 Id. at 70, n. 10.  
16 Id. at 70. 
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individual citizens of those member states.17
 The obligation extends not only to the contracting party in whose  
 Chamberlain, in his explanation of Article 
Nineteen states: 
 territory the conflict is taking place, who may be the de jure  
 government, but also to insurgents engaged in conflict either with  
 the de jure government or among themselves. This raises the question  
 as to how an entity that is not a State can be bound by the Convention.  
 . . .  In case of an internal conflict a Contracting State may be  
 powerless to prevent violations of the Convention by insurgent forces.  
 But this does not mean that the State is absolved of any responsibility   
 for the duty to prevent further violations and to bring to justice those  
responsible for the violations of the Convention.18
 
 
 Article Three obligates the member nations to protect their own cultural property during 
times of peace, if they desire protection for it during times of war. Article Nineteen, on the other 
hand, requires member nations to protect their cultural property during any armed conflict that is 
not of an international character, such as civil war. As mentioned above, the weakest point of 
the Convention is that it does not create explicit and compulsory obligations on the member 
states to protect cultural property during times of peace, nor does it obligate member states to 
protect cultural property from willful destruction during conflicts that do not rise to the level of 
“armed conflict not of international character,” as described in the Hague Convention and the 
Second Protocol. In short, situations like riots, and actions sanctioned by a bona fide 
government during peacetimes, are simply not within the scope of the Convention. The 
particular scope of the Hague was further elaborated on in the Second Protocol of 1999, which 
is discussed below.   
B. F irst and Second Protocols to the Hague Convention of 1954 
 At the 1954 Intergovernmental Conference, which drafted the Hague Convention, the 
earlier versions were heavily criticized for being extremely focused on private law aspects of 
                                                 
17 Id. at 70. 
18 Id. at 70-71. 
7 
protection of cultural property during times of war.19 Many delegations suggested that aspects of 
public law should be considered; however, the Hague was passed without the incorporation of 
such suggestions. Ultimately, another protocol would be created under which public law 
concerns would be addressed.20
The First Protocol, which supplements the Hague Convention of 1954, is comprised of 
three parts. The first part is concerned with the return of property exported from occupied 
territories. The second part deals with the return of property from one party to another when a 
party has removed cultural objects for safekeeping.
  
21 The third part of the First Protocol mainly 
deals with housekeeping matters and is unique to this Protocol because it allows the parties to 
accept the Protocol in its entirety, or to accept only Parts I or II.22
 By the early 1990’s, the effectiveness of the Hague Convention was greatly questioned, 
mainly due to the vast damage to cultural property during the Second Gulf War, and the war in 
the former Yugoslavia.
  
23
                                                 
19 Id. at 139. 
  As a result of multiple international reviews on the validity and 
effectiveness of the 1954 Hague Convention and the First Protocol, a diplomatic conference to 
create a second protocol took place in 1999. Soon thereafter, the Second Protocol was adopted 
at Hague. The purpose of the Second Protocol, apart from introducing some new elements 
concerning the protection of cultural property, was to provide greater precision to the more 
vague provisions of the 1954 Hague Convention. The scope of the Hague and the situations to 
which it applied were not defined in the original convention. The Second Protocol attempted to 
clarify this vagueness and stated that it applied to armed conflicts of an international character 
and to conflicts not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the 
20 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 1, at 139. 
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 150. 
23 Id. at 168. 
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Parties.24 However, it is clear from various commentaries on Article Twenty-Two of the Second 
Protocol that the Hague and the Protocols did not apply to “situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature.”25 Commentators agree that this article, and Article Nineteen of the Hague Convention, 
do not extend to situations such as riots; however, it can be assumed that mostly civil war type 
situations are covered in the provisions dealing with armed conflicts not of an international 
nature.26
C. 1970 UNE SCO Convention  
  Furthermore, by the virtue of the Hague Convention and the two Protocols being 
mostly war time treaties, with limited peace time application, peace time destruction by the 
government of its own  a state are not covered under the subsequent Protocols or the original 
Convention.   
 Like the Hague Convention, the UNESCO Convention also contains several treaties that 
protect cultural property both during times of peace and war.27 There are three primary articles 
that deal with cultural property during wartime. The first provision is Article Eleven, which 
expands Part I of the First Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954. Article Eleven makes the 
export and transfer of ownership of cultural property under coercion arising due to occupation 
by foreign states “illicit” or unlawful.28
                                                 
24 Id. at 168-69. 
 The next provision, Article Seven, is in effect during 
wartime, as well as during peacetime, and requires members to make certain that museums in 
their jurisdiction are not acquiring illegally exported cultural objects from war torn areas. It 
further obligates states to provide assistance to other contracting members by facilitating the 
25 Second Protocol, supra note 6, at art. 22(2).  
26 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 1, at 171. 
27 Id. at 16. 
28 Id. 
9 
return of illicitly exported objects.29  Article Nine of the UNESCO Convention is another 
provision that has utility during times of conflict because it gives contracting members the right 
to call for assistance from other contracting states if they feel that their “cultural patrimony” is 
in jeopardy from pillage.30 While this provision does not specifically mention conflict 
situations, circumstances arising from internal or international conflict would be one obvious 
circumstance where the pillaging of archeological sites and ethological sites would be likely to 
occur.31
 The one major limitation of the UNESCO Convention as a whole is, as the name 
suggests, it is limited to dealing with movement of cultural property. In other words, the 
UNESCO Convention primarily deals with movable cultural property, and not monuments and 
structures that are often the target of hostility during cultural conflicts. Unlike Article One of the 
Hague, Article One of the UNESCO Convention does not mention immovable cultural property, 
and mostly deals with things such as archaeological objects, antiquities, art, historical 
manuscripts, etc.
 The article obligates contracting members to assist only if another contracting member 
has requested such assistance. Therefore, Article Nine is of no particular use where the 
contracting state has not requested such assistance, and is responsible for the pillaging. 
32
                                                 
29 Id. at 17 
 This narrow focus on movable cultural property is appropriate in the context 
of the UNESCO Convention because this convention is mainly concerned with the import and 
export of cultural property obtained through illegal means. The UNESCO Convention, as the 
name suggests, is an import-export based treaty, focusing on primarily the illicit movement of 
cultural objects. It is not effective, or even applicable, in protecting actual monuments like 
ancient temples, a cliff face statute, or an ancient city. For this reason, the UNESCO convention 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 1, at 16. 
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cannot be considered a major vehicle for the protection of cultural monuments and is removed 
from the following discussion.  
D. World Heritage Convention 
 Immovable cultural property, such as religious buildings, palaces, castles, and other 
landmarks, would be prime targets during cultural, or religious, conflicts. The Hague 
Convention of 1954 and the World Heritage Conventions are really the only major treaties that 
provide protections for immovable cultural property. The World Heritage Convention provides 
for the designation of sites of preeminent world importance as World Heritage Sites.33 Article 
Eleven of the Convention requires parties to submit to the World Heritage Committee, 
established by the Convention, an inventory of cultural property situated in their territory which 
would be suitable for inclusion in the World Heritage List.34
 Other noteworthy parts of the World Heritage Convention deal with more generalized 
duties and obligations, rather than specifically addressing the issue of protection of cultural 
property during times of conflict.
  
35 Article Four creates a “general duty on States Parties to 
identify, protect, conserve and transmit to future generations the cultural and natural heritage 
situated in its territory.”36Article Six creates an obligation to refrain from deliberately taking 
measures that may damage directly, or indirectly, cultural property situated on the territory of 
another party member.37 Originally, Article Six was explicitly meant to apply during wartimes, 
however, it no longer does so, and most states are still governed by their obligations under the 
Hague Convention of 1954 during times of armed conflict.38
                                                 
33 Id. at 17. 
 Although the World Heritage 
34 Id. at 17-18. 
35 Id. at 18 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 1, at 18. 
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Convention is ambiguous as to its application in times of armed conflict, the use of the World 
Heritage List by UNESCO to protect sites in Dubrovnik, during the civil war there, established 
its limited usefulness in times of armed conflict.  
 The treaties mentioned above, however, seems to have little or no effect in cases like the 
Babri Mosque Riots in India, or the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan, as 
usually they are treaties that deal with armed conflict of international nature -- wars. These two 
incidents provide perfect examples of why a human rights based approach to protection of 
cultural heritage is more appropriate than one couched in the post-world war II internationalism.  
III.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. Destruction of the Babri Mosque 
 For many Indians, history and mythology blend to create a heightened sense of 
possessiveness towards old structures, statutes, and sites, depicting the mythological past of 
India. In a nation where there is a Hindu past, an Islamic past, and an historical past, conflicts 
between the two religious groups sharing a tenuous peace are inevitable. The issue of the Babri 
Mosque in the holy city of Ayodhya was fodder for dissension between the Hindu and Muslim 
fundamentalists looking to shape the image of India in their particular culture rather than the 
diverse secular nation it is.  
  B.B. Lal, an archaeologist who was very much a product of the historically mythical 
Hindu culture, worked to determine the historicity of the two Hindu epics of Mahabharata and 
Ramayana.39 In 1975, he began excavating Ayodhya City, which is famed as the birthplace of a 
major Hindu god.40
                                                 
39 B.B. Lal, A Note on the E xcavations at Ayodhya with reference to the Mandir-Masjid Issue, in 
DESTRUCTION AND CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 117, 117-18 (Robert Layton, et. al. ed., 2001). 
 The excavations continued till 1986, and a full report was submitted in 
40 Id. at 118 
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1993.41 The real controversy regarding this site began with a discovery made early on in the 
excavations.42 While the excavation as a whole failed to provide any substantial evidence to the 
claim of a flourishing civilization in which Hindu gods and goddesses were born on earth, it did 
provide one archeological find on which Hindu fundamentalists renewed the ongoing feud with 
the Muslim population of India.43 Next to the mosque, fourteen pillars depicting Hindu carvings 
were discovered. Stone slabs with carvings discussing a Hindu temple were also discovered on 
the site embedded into the Mosque walls.44
 The Babri Mosque was an important structure not only for Islamic, religious, purposes, 
but also for historical and architectural reasons.
 This discovery led to claims that the Muslim 
invaders had destroyed a previously existing Hindu temple to build the Babri Mosque, and thus 
the land rightfully belonged to the Hindus.  
45 It provided insight in to early Mughal 
architecture in northeastern India. An annotation by a translator of the Baburnama, the 
autobiography of the first Mughal Emperor, Babur,46 provides some limited information as to 
the creation of the Mosque.47 In 935 A.D., a man called Mir-Baqi commissioned the the Mosque 
in honor of Babur.48 His memoirs made no mention of a previous Hindu temple erected on that 
site, nor are there any discussions about the demolition of old structures before the construction 
of the Mosque.49
                                                 
41 Id. 
 The only mention of a Hindu temple being on site is found in a column in the 
42 Id. at 119 
43 Id. at 118 
44 Id. at 119 
45 Lal, supra note 40, at 135 
46 Mughal invader of India; Grandfather of Akbar the Great, the greatest Mughal Emperor of India, and great 
great grandfather of Emperor Shah Jahan who had the Taj Mahal built in remembrance of his deceased wife.  
47 Ram Sharan Sharma, The Ayodhya Issue, in DESTRUCTION AND CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
127, 135 (Robert Layton, et. al. ed. 2001). 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
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Faziabad Gazetter at the turn of the twentieth century.50 Mrs. Beveridge, a columnist for the 
Gazetter, amended her annotations to the autobiography to include the notation that the mosque 
was built on a Hindu site, and further added her own assumption that the temple was dedicated 
to the major Hindu god Rama.51 Furthermore, there was no textual evidence to support this 
assertion in any of the ancient Hindu texts discussing pilgrimage sites and temples in Ganges 
planes.52 Indeed, many scholars speculate that Ayodhya rose to the level of a major pilgrimage 
site rather late in Indian history.53
 For purposes of fundamentalist politics, the assertion that Ayodhya was not a major 
pilgrimage site historically provided a perfect opportunity to incite the Indian public in the name 
of religion.
  
54 On December 6, 1992, the Kar Sevaks, a group consisting of thousands of Hindu 
fundamentalists, destroyed the Babri Masjid.55 This was the culmination of several years of 
political campaigns by Hindu Nationalist leaders calling for the rebuilding of a Hindu temple on 
the site of the mosque.56 In the time leading up to this event, some 151 people had died 
nationwide.57 The army had been called in to control the riots, and a curfew in towns and cities 
was commonplace.58 These events were merely a small preview of the violence and mayhem yet 
to come.59
                                                 
50 Id. 
 Two days after the razing of the mosque violence had spread across the nation and 
51 Id. at 136. 
52 Id. at 127-129. 
53 Sharma, supra note 48, at 128. 
54 B.B. Lal, A Note on the E xcavations at Ayodhya with reference to the Mandir-Masjid Issue, in 
DESTRUCTION AND CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 117, 123 (Robert Layton, et. al. ed., 2001). 
55 Sharma, supra note 48, at 142. 
56 Nandini Rao & C. Rammanohar, Ayodhya, the Print Media and Communalism, in DESTRUCTION AND 
CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY, 139, 143 (Robert Layton, et. al. ed., 2001) (lists chronology of 
events leading up to the destruction, and immediately preceding the destruction of the mosque.) 
57 Id.   
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
14 
230 more people had died in the resulting riots.60 By December 12, 1992, six days later, the 
death toll had risen to 950.61 By the time the dispute was under control and the riots had 
dissipated, some 2000 people had died due to the violence.62
B. The demolition of the Bamiyan Buddhas  
  
 Bamiyan Valley in Afghanistan was part of the “pan-continental Buddhist culture that 
stretched from west Central Asia to China, lasting in Afghanistan until the early eleventh 
century when Central Asia was overrun by Islamic tribes and the long-standing commercial 
routes to western China were severed.”63 Bamiyan Valley was home to some of the most 
impressive statues of the Shakyamuni Buddha, known now as the Bamiyan Buddhas, which 
dated back to the early part of the seventh century.64 Starting in 1222, with the invasion of 
Ghengis Khan, the statues suffered mass damage at the hands of invaders and settlers.65
 The Bamiyan Buddhas were highly important to the documentation of Central Asian 
material culture, the migration of culture along the silk route, and the subsequent non-Islamic 
cultures of Afghanistan and surrounding areas.
  
66 The Buddhas were a central place of worship 
during pre-Islamic Afghanistan.67
                                                 
60 Id. 
 After the Taliban’s victory over the ruling class in the mid-
1900s, Afghanistan’s systematic transition into a fundamentalist, orthodox, Islamic State began. 
On February 26, 2001, Mullah Mohammed Omar (“Mullah Omar”), the leader of the Taliban, 
61 Id. 
62 Q &  A:  Ayodhya Dispute, BBC News, Sept. 30, 2010, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-
11435240.  
63 DEREK GILLMAN, THE IDEA OF CULTURAL HERITAGE, 10 (2010).  
64 ROBERT BEVAN, THE DESTRUCTION OF MEMORY, 124 (2006).  (although the focus of the journalists and 
thus the rest of the world was on the two largest Buddha statues, there were actually several statues of much 
smaller girth carved into the mountain side along with the two large statues).  
65 GILLMAN, supra note 64, at 10. 
66 Id. at 12. 
67 Id. 
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issued an edict to destroy all statues, proclaiming them to be idolatrous.68 Although  Mullah 
Omar claimed statues to be against “Islamic order,” Egyptian Fahmi Howeidy, a major expert of 
Islamic religion, stated that it was the Taliban’s edict that was contrary to Islam, because “Islam 
[is a religion that] respects other cultures even if they include rituals that are against Islamic 
law.”69
 This decision came as a shock to the international community because Mullah Omar had 
declared early in the Taliban’s reign that the Bamiyan Buddhas were rare ancient monuments.
  
70 
He had previously reasoned that since there were no practicing Buddhists in Afghanistan, the 
statues were excluded from the Taliban’s campaign against idolatry.71 The Taliban by this time 
had already caved under the pressure of the even more radical al-Qaeda and the clerics and 
militants that gathered around them.72 “It was claimed,” says Bevan in his account of the 
destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan Valley, “that the pressure to destroy the statues came 
after lobbying from the foreign militants gathered around al-Qaeda, supported by Islamic clerics 
in Saudi Arabia who, it has been argued, are resistant to the incorporation of items of material 
culture under Islamic control into universal notions of art-historical value.”73 Soon, thereafter, a 
rapid destruction of statues began. On March 3, 2001, the international press reported that the 
destruction of the two main Buddha statues had begun, and it continued for two days..74
                                                 
68 Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International 
Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 626 (2003).  
 Nations 
across the world made pleas with the Afghan government to spare the statues, or to sell them so 
they could exist in their entirety in other parts of the world where the unique beauty and 
69 Id. at 627. 
70 GILLMAN, supra note 64, at 10.  
71 Id.  
72 BEVAN, supra note 65, at 126. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
16 
religious value of the Shakyamuni was better understood.75 The pleas fell on deaf ears. 
“[D]espite the difficulties met by Afghan troops in destroying the solid rock carved statues, the 
Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, confirmed on 6 March, 2001 that destruction of all statues, 
including the two Buddhas, was being completed.”76
IV.  LOOPHOLES: INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATIES 
  
 Out of the two examples discussed above, the Babri Mosque scenario better exemplifies 
why international treaties did not work..77 The Babri Mosque example clearly falls within the 
more obvious loopholes of the Hague Convention and the World Heritage Convention, both of 
which India is a party to In the Hague Convention the situation that climaxed with the 
destruction of the Babri Mosque can in no way be defined as a civil war. The destruction of the 
Mosque was a result of internal political strife surrounded by riots. Article Twenty-Two of the 
Second Protocol would not cover this situation, as there was no “armed conflict,” or even a non-
armed conflict, of any sort until after the Mosque was razed.78 No other nations were involved, 
and even the Indian government was somewhat detached from the entire incident. Furthermore, 
the obligations imposed by the Hague Convention to protect cultural monuments during peace 
time only extend to the preparation for safeguarding against harm to cultural property against 
foreseeable effects of an armed conflict.79
                                                 
75 Corrine Brenner, Cultural Property Law:  Reflecting on the Bamiyan Buddhas' Destruction, 29 Suffolk 
Transnat'l L. Rev. 237, 251 (2006). 
 While it can be argued that the Indian government 
could have foreseen the civil strife and therefore taken steps to protect the Babri Mosque, that 
supposition can be countered by the argument that the Indian government did not anticipate an 
76 Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 68, at 627 (emphasis added). 
77 While most of the legal scholars have focused on the impact of the Ayodhya controversy on the secularist 
nature of India, and the role of the Indian judiciary in settling the controversy, there has been practically no 
analysis of India’s obligations under the three treatises, and the reaction of the international community to the 
destruction of the mosque itself.  
78 Second Protocol, art. 22, March 26, 1999, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001306/130696eo.pdf..  
79 Id. at art. 3. 
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armed conflict within the scope of the Hague Convention, and thus was not under any obligation 
to take measures to protect the Mosque. The ambiguity about the scope of the Hague 
Convention leads to multiple interpretations, which create a loophole through which a nation 
can escape its obligation to protect cultural property from harm.  
 The ambiguity concerning the scope of the Hague Convention similarly arises within the 
World Heritage Convention. India is also a party to the World Heritage Convention and is 
generally obligated to identify, protect, conserve and transmit to future generations the cultural 
and natural heritage situated in its territory.80 As mentioned in the Hague Convention context, 
this obligation is extremely vague and does not create a duty that can be enforced through 
sanctions or other means. As long as some attempt has been made to oblige this general mandate 
of the treaty, a State’s obligations can be considered fulfilled. Concerning the other obligations 
imposed by the World Heritage Convention, the language of the Convention requires that a state 
upkeep and protect structures and natural areas if the committee agrees that they are world 
heritage caliber.81 The weaknesses of the World Heritage Convention can be succinctly 
described as follows: rights granted by the Convention are held by individual states, which 
means that only member states have “discretion when deciding which of their territorial sites 
will be placed on the World Heritage List and which objects are worthy of assistance.”82
                                                 
80 See Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, November 23, 1972, 27 
U.S.T. 37, available at http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001333/133369e.pdf [hereinafter World Heritage 
Convention] (India is listed as one of the party nations, and states that have successfully ratified and implemented 
the treaty). 
 Thus, 
the World Heritage Convention provides great power to the states, and as discussed later in the 
Bamiyan context, enforcement by governing bodies and the international community is lax.  
 The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas provides a slightly harder problem. Even if 
81 See generally Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, November 23, 
1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, available at http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001333/133369e.pdf [hereinafter World 
Heritage Convention]. 
82 Brenner, supra note 75, at 259. 
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Afghanistan was a party to the Hague Convention of 1954 and its Protocols, which it is not, its 
applicability to the Buddha situation is questionable. One major reason for the ambiguity 
surrounding the Hague Convention’s effectiveness is that: “[a]lthough the Convention provides 
a useful framework for protecting  cultural property, it is futile when one party intentionally 
destroys cultural property or identity. The 1954 Hague Convention’s premise is that threats to 
cultural property come from external parties, not the controlling state.”83 The 1954 Hague 
Convention is further inapplicable in the Buddha’s situation “because the Bamiyan Valley was 
free of hostilities and securely under the Taliban's control” when the Buddhas were destroyed.84
 The World Heritage Convention provides more of a substantive analysis because 
Afghanistan is a party to it, and if Taliban can be seen as a legitimate government, they acceded 
to the Convention.
 
The Buddhas were not harmed in the fighting, and thus their destruction falls within the realm of 
willful peacetime, rather than wartime, destruction.  
85 As mentioned above, the World Heritage Convention places a lot of power 
in the hands of the member states because it is the member states that determine which of their 
sites are eligible for the list .86 The situation in Afghanistan is unique because the Buddhas were 
not placed on the World Heritage List until two years after their destruction at the hands of 
Taliban.87 However, the general duty to identify, protect, conserve and transmit to future 
generations the cultural and natural heritage situated in its territory could have created an 
obligation on the Afghan government.88
                                                 
83 Id. at 257-59. 
 This general obligation seems to create a duty to protect 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 259. 
87 Id. 
88 Brenner, supra note 75, at 258. 
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cultural property even when it is not on the World Heritage List.89 Taliban's deliberate 
destruction of the Buddhas could be considered a breach of Afghanistan's general duty to protect 
its cultural property.90 Ultimately, several commentators agree that there was sufficient legal 
basis to sanction the Afghan government under the World Heritage Convention.91 Sanctions, 
such as suspension of technical assistance or withdrawal of financial aid, could have been 
adopted against Afghanistan.92 As we know, in the aftermath of the destruction no states, nor 
UNESCO, took any measures against Afghanistan.93  The international community’s apathy 
shows that both of these Conventions are mostly “toothless” treaties which really only provide 
protections in extremely limited circumstances.94
V.NEW PHILOSOPHY, NEW LAW 
 
 The conditions and ideologies that gave birth to the Hague Convention of 1954 are just 
as important as the document itself. The Hague Convention was a direct result of the loss of life 
and property experienced by the international community during World War II.95 The preamble 
to the Hague Convention sets out the philosophy that the drafters sought to encapsulate through 
the treaty provisions.96 The preamble states in relevant part: “Being convinced that damage to 
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of 
all humankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.”97
                                                 
89 Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International 
Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 631 (2003).  
 Cultural 
90 Id.  
91 Brenner, supra note 75, at 260; Franconi & Lenzerini, supra note 60, 631. 
92 Brenner, supra note 75, at 260.  
93 Id. at 259. 
94 Andrea Cunning, The Safeguarding of Cultural Property in Times of War and Peace, 11  TULSA J. COMP. & 
INT'L L. 211, 227 (2003). 
95 KEVIN CHAMBERLAIN, WAR AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 22 (2004)..  
96 John Henry Merryman, The F ree International Movement of Cultural Property, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1, 11 (1998). 
97 Hague Convention of 1954, preamble, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000824/082464mb.pdf  
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internationalism, or the idea that “there is a legally cognizable international interest in cultural 
property,”98
 On the other side of this discourse is what Merryman defines as the “source nation 
discourse.”
 is an idea that works best in an international context, where two or more states are 
engaged in armed conflict. 
99 The 1970 UNESCO Convention best embodies and supports this school of 
thought.100 The source nation discourse focuses on the relationship between cultural objects and 
the national history, culture, and identity of a state.101 To exhibit this perspective, the UNESCO 
Convention employs terminology like “cultural patrimony,” “cultural heritage,” and 
“protection.”102
 While source nation discourse goes a long way in connecting a nation’s interest with the 
cultural object, it also has the negative effect of connecting national identity with a cultural 
object.
 Source nation discourse has one inherent flaw; what makes up the cultural 
heritage and identity of a particular nation is defined by the state, most often by the controlling 
government.  
103
                                                 
98 Merryman, supra note 94, at 11. 
 This could result in the situations discussed above -- destruction of the remains of a 
Buddhist past of an Islamic nation and apathy toward the destruction of an Islamic structure in a 
nation striving to establish a Hindu identity. The weak points mentioned above stem from the 
approaches that the Conventions seek to embody, and to a certain degree, the focus of 
international law on state to state relationships. To have an effective system of cultural property 
protection it is necessary that individuals be held liable for actions that violate international law, 
rather than simply relying on states to create domestic law criminalizing the destruction of 
99 Id. at 12 
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 See generally Merryman, supra note 94. 
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cultural property.104
 The human rights regime is one of the mechanisms that has proven to be extremely 
effective in creating individual responsibility directly to the international. One example of a 
successful human rights regime is the Statute of the International Tribunal of the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), which was created by the United Nations Security Council after the end 
of the Balkan hostilities in the 1990s.
 Simply put, there needs to be direct responsibility to the international 
community.  
105 The ICTY tribunal was created for “the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law.”106 The ICTY has jurisdiction to 
prosecute persons for “violations of the laws and customs of war and crimes against 
Humanity.”107 For example, the ICTY found three men guilty of crimes against humanity after 
they had deliberately attacked ancient mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that case the ICTY 
found that because the destruction was committed with discriminatory intent it amounted to an 
attack on a people’s religious identity, and thus constituted a crime against humanity.108  “The 
ICTY blurs the distinction between crimes against people and crimes against property, 
ultimately stating that such crimes may violate human rights. This precedent will be enormously 
helpful in advancing the law in this area.”109
                                                 
104 Brenner, supra note 75, at 257, n. 109 (“The 1999 Second Protocol provides examples of the following 
measures to be taken during peacetime: including preparing inventories, planning of emergency measures 
against fire or structural collapse, preparing for removal of movable property and adequate in-situ protection 
of property and designating competent authorities to safeguard the property.”); see also Cunning, supra note 
92, at 236.  
  
105 Brenner, supra note 75, at 268.  
106 Id.   
107 Id. 
108 Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International 
Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 637 (2003).; Brenner, supra note 75, at 268.  
109 Brenner, supra note 75, at 268 (citing Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of 
Armed Conflict:  The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the F ormer Yugoslavia, 14 Harv. 
Hum. Rts. J. 1, 31 (2001) (finding ICTY decisions making crimes against property crimes against humanity in 
certain contexts); Victoria A. Birov, Prize or Plunder?  The Pillage of Works of Art and the International Law 
22 
 The ICTY approach would work best in the Babri Mosque context. The creation of an 
ICTY -type statute that creates a human rights interest in the protection of cultural and religious 
objects would be the best path to fixing the loopholes in the Hague Convention and the World 
Heritage Convention left by with the absence of a scheme to deal with conflicts that do not rise 
to the level of a civil war. By creating individual responsibility, political leaders working behind 
the scenes to create political and civil disorder and incite riots would be held personally liable 
under criminal charges for the destruction of cultural property. Such a statute would create an 
incentive for local leaders to ensure that their actions do not lead to the destruction of cultural 
sites as it did in the Babri Mosque incident.  
 This approach, however, would not easily transfer to the Bamiyan Buddha example. It 
was easier to see the human rights violation in the Babri Mosque riots, as the Hindu majority 
destroyed a religious symbol of a large minority in India and mostly Muslims were killed in the 
riots preceding and following the razing of the Mosque.110 It is more difficult to see the human 
rights violation in the destruction of Bamiyan Buddhas. Reportedly, at the time of the 
destruction of the Buddhas there were no practicing Buddhists in Afghanistan.111
                                                                                                                                                            
of War, 30 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 201, 211 (1998) (stating ICTY decisions enormously helpful in expanding 
protection of cultural property)). 
 The only way 
that this would constitute as a human rights violation is if the actions of the Taliban could be 
considered a human rights affront to Buddhists in other nations, or even more broadly to any 
other religion that conflicts with Islam on a regular basis. The Human Rights approach 
discussed above is the most appropriate approach in the present state of the world where it can 
never be forgotten that, “[s]tates are certainly capable of violating the human rights of their own 
110  Nandini Rao & C. Rammanohar, Ayodhya, The Print Media and Communalism, in DESTRUCTION AND 
CONSERVATION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY, 139, 142 (Robert Layton, et. al. ed., 2001)   
111 See Richard F. Nyrop & Donald M. Seekins, Religion, in AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY STUDY, at 
http://library.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/Religion.html.; see also GILLMAN, supra note 64, at 10. 
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people,” and certainly they could be capable of violating the human rights of nationals of other 
states.112
 Wangkeo defines the cultural protection regime in the human rights context as follows: 
  
In order for a cultural object to be protected . . . , it would have to fulfill two 
conditions: (1) it must be constitutive of a group's identity; and (2) it must not be 
symbolic of repugnant values in international law. In order for a state's destructive 
conduct to be objectionable, it would also have to satisfy two criteria: (1) it would 
indeed have to constitute iconoclasm (the destruction of the relic in order to 
eradicate its symbolic power) . . . ; and (2) the act would have to be antagonistic to 
international law, violating human rights standards or flouting international norms 
of conduct, for example.113
 
 
 In the Bamiyan Buddhas context, the criteria laid out by Wangkeo are met. The giant 
Buddhas symbolized the Buddhist identity in Asia, both religiously and historically, and they 
did not represent views that were repugnant to international law ideals. Thus, the first prong is 
satisfied, and the cultural object is falls within a class of objects that need protection. The 
second prong is also satisfied because the actions of the Taliban constituted iconoclasm, i.e. the 
statues were destroyed to obliterate the symbolic value they held in Afghanistan as a symbol of 
a non-Islamic past -- and the destruction of the statutes was antagonistic to international law. In 
such circumstances, even though there was not a group of people directly affected by the 
destruction in Afghanistan, the human rights regime could reach the people responsible for the 
destruction of the statues. While the system proposed by Wangkeo might not provide a perfect 
regime, it certainly closes up the loopholes that allowed situations like the Bamiyan Buddha to 
occur. 
VI.CONCLUSION 
                                                 
112 Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of Destroying Cultural Heritage During 
Peacetime, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 183, 271 (2003) 
113 Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
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Ultimately, under the system discussed above, combined with the creation of a special tribunal 
such as the ICTY discussed above, a regime could be created where individuals are obligated 
not to violate the human rights of any other individual. It is time that the current cultural 
property regime is reevaluated, as the old definition of armed conflict, i.e. state-to-state conflict, 
is not applicable. Cultural wars are the norm of today, and when cultural property is directly 
targeted, and targeted for the reason of cultural cleansing, the treaties need to focus on a human 
rights based approach to the protection of such cultural property.  
